

acted on his own initiative in a manner. But for his prompt action it is more than likely that the city would have been sacked. That policy of assistance which Funston undertook Greely extended into a complete organization, but not until the Mayor and the Committee of Fifty had directly asked him to do so.

This put Greely in the position of acting beyond the authority of a Division General, whose policy had not yet been ratified by the War Department, on the demand of a municipality in distress. In other words, a radical democratic trades-union mayor wanted a temporary extension of power on the part of that dreaded arm of autocracy, an army, which the conservative head of the War Department was loth to give. But if San Francisco was to be saved from a plague of typhoid fever it was to be done by the application of military measures with the army medical corps in charge; and if order was to be maintained it must be maintained by other than the local police forces, which were wholly inadequate in point of numbers. Moreover, in this crisis, the Federal troops were the only available resource for assistance. By the total disablement of the telephonic and telegraphic systems, the difficulty of mobilizing the National Guard of the State was enormously aggravated. Nor could this militia have been brought together in sufficient numbers for several days. The First Battalion Coast Artillery, N. G. C., one of the crack organizations of the State, was on duty in the city at the earliest moment. On the first day of the fire it performed heroic service, collecting food from unburned stores and warehouses, and feeding over 100,000 people. The State militia also did noble work in Oakland, Santa Rosa, San Jose, and several other towns.

During the Spanish War San Franciscans had cause to regret the existence of a military reservation, which filled the streets with soldiers on leave. To-day they are