

ROBERT E. LEE

This plan he was forbidden to adopt, though he considered it the best of all the plans, and he thereupon selected the route by way of Fortress Monroe and the Peninsula, against the views of the government authorities, who greatly desired him to adopt the overland route by Manassas, across which Johnston lay with an army then believed to number over 100,000 men, but really containing certainly less than half that number.* Indeed, it was actually about 35,000 men.

Illness during the autumn and early winter of 1861 prevented McClellan's acting with the efficiency which he might otherwise have shown; but even more disastrous than this was his determination not to move until he had an army sufficiently great and properly organized to make his success assured. For this reason mainly he resisted alike the importunities of the President and the Secretary of War and the clamor of the public until on toward the spring, by which time he had sacrificed the good-will of the former and the confidence of both.

Jackson, acting on a suggestion of Lee's, settled the question of the Shenandoah Valley plan by the battle of Winchester and his brilliant retreat between two converging armies down the valley,

* *Ibid.*